Rather, it is thought to follow from an alleged parallel between how the FUL handles the maxim of convenience killing and how it handles the maxim of nonbeneficence. As we have seen, Herman's reasoning runs as follows: the maxim of nonbeneficence fails in the second stage of the FUL test, yet it is sometimes permissible to be nonbeneficent.
The maxim of convenience killing also fails in the second stage, so it must follow that it is sometimes permissible to kill for the sake of convenience. The Latitude Problem owes its existence entirely to this alleged parallel between convenience killing and nonbeneficence. The parallel between the cases of nonbeneficence and convenience killing, however, is merely apparent: it depends on an equivocation.
In order to show this, I first consider Kant's account of the moral status of nonbeneficence and then use this analysis to solve or rather dissolve the Latitude Problem. In the Groundwork , Kant claims that the maxim of nonbeneficence fails the FUL test in the second stage of the procedure, yielding a contradiction in the will G Elsewhere, he argues that we have a duty to adopt the maxim of beneficence instead G ; CPrR —5; MM , —4.
This latitude concerns acting on the maxim of beneficence. In the Metaphysics of Morals , Kant explicitly notes that this latitude implies that it is sometimes permissible to refrain from acting beneficently, but he adds an important proviso. Kant goes on to contrast moral merit both with moral deficiency and with vice. The first type of violation is the failure to adopt a maxim of promoting a morally obligatory end, for example the failure to adopt the maxim of beneficence.
After all, one ought to fulfil one's duties of virtue and adopt the corresponding maxims. In terms of Kant's moral accounting analogy, one ought to have a positive score. It can refer 1 to an agent's limiting his adopted maxim of beneficence by another maxim of duty; 2 to an agent's failing to adopt the maxim of beneficence, without the agent adopting the maxim of nonbeneficence; or 3 to an agent's acting on the maxim of nonbeneficence.
Nonbeneficence of the first type is permissible, but nonbeneficence of the second or third type is not. The second constitutes a lack of virtue and the third constitutes vice. In terms of this taxonomy, then, the only type of nonbeneficence that is morally permissible is the first. Well-known examples in the Kantian literature include cases in which maxims of wide duty are limited by maxims of strict duty.
For example, the maxim of beneficence is limited by the maxim never to lie: it is morally impermissible to benefit some people by lying to others. Furthermore, maxims of wide duty may limit each other. Consider the example of the wide duty of beneficence and the wide duty to develop your talents. Sometimes you can fulfil both duties at the same time, developing your talents by helping others, as in the case of a medical student working as a volunteer in a disaster relief program. In other situations, you will have to choose, and in such cases acting on the maxim of beneficence limits your acting on the maxim of developing your talents, or vice versa.
This should not be misunderstood as your renouncing the one maxim in favour of the other. Rather, you remain committed to both principles but limit the one by the other. For example, you may put the development of your talents temporarily on hold for the sake of helping someone in need, or, conversely, you may temporarily put your beneficent activities on hold while you are studying for exams.
Kant illustrates this point by saying that one's parental duties may limit one's general beneficence MM In all of this, there is latitude only with regard to maxims of duty. Nonbeneficence is permissible only in cases where the agent has adopted the maxim of beneficence but limits this maxim of duty by another maxim of duty.
Nonbeneficence is impermissible , however, when the agent fails to adopt the maxim of beneficence lack of virtue or acts on the maxim of nonbeneficence vice , that is, on the principle of never helping others. In other words, there certainly is latitude regarding the fulfilment of the duty of beneficence, but this does not include permission to act on maxims that fail the test articulated in the FUL.
Nowhere does Kant state that it is sometimes permissible to act on the maxim of nonbeneficence. In the context of the discussion of the Latitude Problem, only two of the three types of nonbeneficence are in play. Given the way in which Herman develops her argument, her focus is not on nonbeneficence in the sense of a mere failure to adopt the maxim of beneficence.
We are not dealing with a mere lack of virtue, since what is at issue is the occasional action on a maxim that is assumed to yield a contradiction in the will: action on the maxim of convenience killing. I therefore set aside nonbeneficence in the sense of a lack of virtue. Principled nonbeneficence involves acting on the maxim of nonbeneficence, whereas principled-beneficence-on-standby involves not acting on one's adopted maxim of beneficence, for the sake of some other duty.
To illustrate the difference between these two types of nonbeneficence, let me compare a Kantian agent and her vicious twin. Consider Immanuela, who realizes that acting on the maxim of nonbeneficence is morally impermissible and who instead has adopted, from duty, the maxim of beneficence. During a particular week, she does not act on her maxim of beneficence, because she is studying for her medical exams, in a remote location cut off from the outside world.
She is instead acting on her maxim of developing her socially useful talents cf. G , a maxim she has also adopted from duty.
For that whole week, she helps no one, but she certainly is not acting on the maxim of nonbeneficence. Nothing in the set-up of this example implies that she is acting on the basis of a principle of never helping anyone. She knows this maxim to be impermissible, and she has not adopted it. She is still firmly committed to helping others in need. If, during this week, she were to encounter an injured hiker who had lost her way in the woods, she would offer assistance.
Now compare Immanuela to her vicious brother Vic who has adopted the maxim of nonbeneficence and the maxim of convenience killing: he is firmly committed to putting his own interests first. He, too, is studying for his medical exams, being attracted to the study of medicine merely by the prospect of a high income.
If an injured hiker knocked on his door, Vic would ignore her, and if the knocking started bothering him, he would kill her to stop the noise. Immanuela has adopted the maxim of beneficence, but her beneficence is temporarily on standby. Vic has adopted the maxim of nonbeneficence; he is nonbeneficent as a matter of principle. Once we keep these two types of nonbeneficence distinct, the Latitude Problem completely disappears.
Recall that Herman's argument has two steps. She first claims that the maxim of convenience killing fails the FUL test in the same way as the maxim of nonbeneficence, since in both cases universalizing the maxim yields a contradiction in the will; next, she claims that if it is sometimes permissible to be nonbeneficent, as Kant says it is, then it must sometimes be permissible to kill for the sake of one's convenience.
We can now see that Herman's argument is invalid because she conflates principled nonbeneficence and principled-beneficence-on-standby. From the fact that it is sometimes permissible not to act on one's maxim of beneficence it does not follow that it is sometimes permissible to act on the maxim of nonbeneficence. As a result, it does not follow that it is sometimes permissible to act on the maxim of convenience killing.
In other words, the fact that both the maxim of nonbeneficence and the maxim of convenience killing fail the FUL test in its second stage as granted for the purpose of this essay does not mean that it is permissible sometimes to kill for the sake of convenience.
If, as I have argued, Kant claims that acting on the maxim of nonbeneficence is always impermissible, then acting on the maxim of convenience killing must similarly be always impermissible—and the Latitude Problem vanishes.
The only permissible form of nonbeneficence is principled-beneficence-on-standby, that is, nonbeneficence on the part of an agent who has adopted the maxim of beneficence. In sum, the fact that there is latitude with regard to principled beneficence does not mean that there is latitude with regard to either principled nonbeneficence or convenience killing or any other maxim that yields a contradiction in the will.
If both maxims yield a contradiction in the will when subjected to the FUL test, then they have the same moral status: both principled nonbeneficence and convenience killing are absolutely impermissible.
The maxim of convenience killing fails the FUL test, and hence acting on this maxim is never morally permissible. The maxim of beneficence passes the test, and not acting on one's maxim of beneficence is sometimes permissible. At this stage, one may be concerned that the proposed solution to the Latitude Problem comes at a high cost, or even that the problem returns in different form.
First, it might seem that the Latitude Problem could easily be reintroduced by reformulating Herman's argument in terms of a permissible counterpart to the maxim of convenience killing. Secondly, it might seem that the proposed solution of the Latitude Problem is at odds with Kant's statement that imperfect duties permit latitude, and hence that it merely trades one problem for another. I address these concerns in turn. First, it might seem that the Latitude Problem can easily be reintroduced via the construction of a morally permissible counterpart of the maxim of convenience killing.
Acting on the maxim of nonbeneficence is always impermissible, but not acting on the maxim of beneficence is sometimes permissible. One might therefore expect it to be possible to formulate a permissible counterpart to the maxim of convenience killing, on a parallel with the maxim of beneficence, such that not acting on that maxim would be sometimes permissible and allow the occasional murder. We are now in a position to explain, however, why not acting on a permissible counterpart maxim will never suffice for an action to count as an instance of convenience killing.
It admits of three construals, only one of which is morally permissible, namely principled-beneficence-on-standby. Its moral status parallels that of principled nonbeneficence.
No matter how we formulate the permissible counterpart to the maxim of convenience killing, therefore, not acting on this maxim, for the sake of another duty, will never constitute killing for the sake of convenience. If we now consider what it would mean to refrain from acting on the maxim to further the convenience of others, for the sake of a strict or wide duty, we can easily see that this does not amount to killing someone for the sake of convenience.
This is true even if someone dies as a result of the agent's decision not to act on the maxim: after all, the agent was motivated by duty, not by a concern for her own convenience.
Again, not acting on this maxim does not equal or imply killing for the sake of convenience. To see why, assume that Immanuela has adopted this maxim, and that on her way back from her study retreat she is shipwrecked and spends the rest of her life on an uninhabited island. She knows that she is the only person there, and she now considers this maxim irrelevant to her practical reasoning. Obviously, her not acting on the basis of this maxim does not mean that she is killing anyone for the sake of getting what she wants.
In sum, not acting on permissible counterpart maxims is insufficient for an agent to count as killing for the sake of getting what she wants.
To qualify as such, the agent must kill someone and do so in order to get what she wants. The result that convenience killing is always impermissible might seem to solve the Latitude Problem at the cost of creating a significant new difficulty. I have been assuming that the maxim of convenience killing fails the FUL test in the second stage and that it is a violation of imperfect duty G According to Kant, imperfect duties permit latitude.
So if acting on the maxim of convenience killing is always impermissible, it might still seem that the result of this paper comes at the price of contradicting Kant's own statement that imperfect duties permit latitude, or at least at the price of restricting this latitude considerably. Kant is not saying that we should look at the intended consequences in order to make a moral evaluation.
Kant is claiming that regardless of intended or actual consequences, moral worth is properly assessed by looking at the motivation of the action, which may be selfish even if the intended consequences are good. One might think Kant is claiming that if one of my intentions is to make myself happy, that my action is not worthy. This is a mistake. The consequence of making myself happy is a good consequence, even according to Kant. Kant clearly thinks that people being happy is a good thing.
There is nothing wrong with doing something with an intended consequence of making yourself happy, that is not selfishness. You can get moral worth doing things that you enjoy, but the reason you are doing them cannot be that you enjoy them, the reason must be that they are required by duty. Also, there is a tendency to think that Kant says it is always wrong to do something that just causes your own happiness, like buying an ice cream cone.
This is not the case. Kant thinks that you ought to do things to make yourself happy as long as you make sure that they are not immoral i. Getting ice cream is not immoral, and so you can go ahead and do it. Doing it will not make you a morally worthy person, but it won't make you a bad person either. Many actions which are permissible but not required by duty are neutral in this way. It is fine if they enjoy doing it, but it must be the case that they would do it even if they did not enjoy it.
The overall theme is that to be a good person you must be good for goodness sake. His argument for this is summarized by James Rachels as follows:. After all, it is not as though people would stop believing each other simply because it is known that people lie when doing so will save lives.
For one thing, that situation rarely comes up—people could still be telling the truth almost all of the time. Even the taking of human life could be justified under certain circumstances. Take self-defense, for example. Maxims and the universal laws that result from them can be specified in a way that reflects all of the relevant features of the situation.
Consider the case of the Inquiring Murderer as described in the text. Suppose that you are in that situation and you lie to the murderer.
This maxim seems to pass the test of the categorical imperative. Procedure for determining whether a proposed action violates CI I am to do x in circumstances y in order to bring about z. I am to lie on a loan application when I am in severe financial difficulty and there is no other way to obtain funds, in order to ease the strain on my finances. Everyone always does x in circumstances y in order to bring about z.
Everyone always lies on a loan application when he is in severe financial difficulty and there is no other way to obtain funds, in order to ease the strain on his finances. Note: assume that after the adjustment to equilibrium the new law is common knowledge -- everyone knows that it is true, everyone knows that everyone knows, etc. The Kantian evaluation rule is this: we must be able to answer yes to both questions for the maxim to be acceptable.
If we get a no answer to either, we must reject the maxim and try to find another one on which to act. This is the example we have been using in spelling out the procedure.
The maxim fails because I must answer "no" to the first question: I could not rationally act on the maxim in the PSW. There are two reasons Kant states for this: 1 promising and 2 the end to be attained by it would be impossible, since no one would believe what was promised him but would laugh at all such utterances as being vain pretenses. Lying on a loan application would not get us anywhere in a world where everyone always lied when under similar circumstances.
The second part of the test is the "contradiction in the will test. The next example is supposed to illustrate a failure of this test. Here the maxim is something like the following:. In order to advance my own interests, I will not do anything to help others in need unless I have something to gain from doing so. The PSW will contain a law of nature of the form:.
To advance his own interests, everyone always refrains from helping others in need unless he has something to gain from doing so. Now Kant would say that there is no problem in conceiving such a PSW in fact, those of a cynical bent might think that the PSW is no different from the existing world.
Applying the first question of the procedure, we see that we cannot answer no to the first question: it would be rational in the PSW to follow the maxim if everyone else is doing the same, because in that world everyone is indifferent to the needs of others, so the best way for you to advance your interests is to be likewise indifferent for you will not gain anything through reciprocity of others by departing from the maxim.
However, according to Kant the second part of the test fails: I could not rationally choose the PSW, because "a will which resolved itself in this way would contradict itself, inasmuch as cases might often arise in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others and in which he would deprive himself, by such a law of nature springing from his own will, of all hope of the aid he wants for himself If a maxim flunks Q1 see above then we have a perfect duty to refrain from acting on that maxim.
If a maxim flunks Q2 see above but not Q1 , then we have an imperfect duty to refrain from acting on that maxim. Illustration : We have a perfect duty not to murder. This means that we must never murder under any circumstances. We have an imperfect duty to help the needy. This means that we should do so on occasion, where this does not conflict with our perfect duties. Duties Perfect Imperfect. To Others tell truth assist others in need. To Self no suicide or. According to Kant, perfect duties duties of justice can appropriately be enforced by means of the public, juridical use of coercion, and the remainder are imperfect duties duties of virtue , which are fit subjects for moral assessment but not coercion.
Martha, as a home-service medical care volunteer, has cared for George through the final weeks of his fatal illness. Kant , italics removed [ 2 ]. The Formula of Humanity contains the command that we ought never to treat persons merely as means.
A few points regarding this command are helpful to keep in view. First, Kant holds that if a person treats someone merely as a means, then she acts wrongly. The Formula of Humanity encompasses an absolute constraint against treating persons merely as means.
Second, Kant does not hold that if in acting a person refrains from treating anyone merely as a means, then she acts rightly Kant She would be acting wrongly by failing to treat the other as an end in himself, rather than by treating him merely as a means.
Some Kantians, especially those engaged primarily in interpretation, rather than reconstruction, of his views thus understandably hold that far more important than understanding his position on treating persons merely as means is understanding his account of treating persons as ends in themselves Wood , Fourth, Kant holds that a person can treat herself merely as a means.
It is difficult to discern how, according to Kant, one treats oneself merely as a means in violating these duties Kerstein ; Timmons Ch. Doing that is widely discussed as a possible violation of a moral constraint. More specifically, the article explores when someone uses another and either treats or refrains from treating the other merely as a means. Does Kant embrace among these others all genetically human beings, including human embryos and individuals in a persistent vegetative state, or does he limit the others to beings who have certain capacities, for example, that to set and rationally pursue ends Kain ; Sussman ?
How should Kant or other theorists set the scope of those whom we ought not to treat merely as means? Should we include some non-human animals e.
How should we determine to whom to grant this moral status? In order to treat another merely as a means or just use him, an agent must use the other or treat him as a means.
But when does someone count as doing that? As noted, using others or treating them as means is often morally permissible. But for our purposes talk of a person using another or treating him as a means implies no such moral judgment. Accounts of treating others merely as means sometimes leave implicit the notions of using another they rely on.
Some points regarding what using another does or does not amount to seem uncontroversial. It does not seem sufficient for us to count as using another as a means that we benefit from what the other has done Nozick 31— If, on her usual route, a runner derives enjoyment from the singing of a stranger who happens to be walking by, she does not appear to be treating the stranger as a means.
If someone frowns at another approaching, for example, he might not thereby be using the other at all; he might simply be expressing that the other is unwelcome. However, inquiry reveals challenges in specifying what using another amounts to. We might say that an agent uses another or, equivalently, treats her as a means just in case the agent intentionally does something to the other in order to secure or as a part of securing one of his ends Kerstein For example, a passenger uses a bus driver if he boards her bus in order to get across town; a wife treats her husband as a means if she lies to him so that his birthday party will be a surprise; and a victim treats a mugger as a means if she punches him in order to escape from his grasp.
In contrast, a pilot who drops bombs solely in order to kill enemy combatants might foresee that innocent bystanders will be harmed. Yet if he does not intentionally do anything to the bystanders, then he does not treat them as means, according to this account. But does the account count too much as treating another as a means? Suppose that an usher at a concert is trying to prevent a small child from falling through railing on a balcony. She pushes a spectator out of the way to get to the child.
The specification we are considering implies that the usher has used the spectator as a means; for she has intentionally done something to her i. Some might say that the usher has treated the spectator in some way, namely, as an obstacle to be displaced. Yet she has not used the spectator.
In order for an agent to count as using another, it is not enough that she do something to the other in order to realize some end of hers, some have suggested. On this account, an agent can count as using another when she is striving to benefit him. For example, a physician giving a patient a treatment to save his life is using the patient.
Some find this implication of the account implausible Parfit One important question left unanswered by this and other accounts of treating another as a means is one of scope. For example, does an agent use another if he uses biospecimens e. If so, then the scope of a constraint on treating others merely as means would extend to the practices of biobanks and technology companies.
Much debate concerning what it means to treat others merely as means stems from a single passage in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Kant is attempting to demonstrate that the Formula of Humanity generates a duty not to make false promises:. He who has it in mind to make a false promise to others sees at once that he wants to make use of another human being merely as a means , without the other at the same time containing in himself the end.
For, he whom I want to use for my purposes by such a promise cannot possibly agree to my way of behaving toward him, and so himself contain the end of this action. In these brief remarks, Kant hints at various ways in which we might understand conditions for treating another merely as a means.
In this section, we discuss elaborations of these ways and others of formulating sufficient conditions for someone who is using another to be treating this other merely as a means. Two agents presumably share an end just in case they are both trying, or have chosen to try, to realize this end. But what, precisely, does it mean to say that two agents cannot share an end?
Suppose the promisor, a borrower, has the end of getting money from the promisee, a lender, without ever paying it back. For according to our practice, it belongs to the very concept of making a loan, as opposed, say, to giving money away, that one believe that what one disburses will be repaid. However, this proposed sufficient condition might fail to register as treating others merely as means paradigmatic cases of doing so Kerstein — It would presumably be good if a sufficient condition for treating another merely as a means yielded the conclusion that the loiterer is treating the passerby merely as a means; for he is mugging her, which, intuitively speaking, seems to be a clear case of treating another merely as a means.
One might question whether the proposed sufficient condition does this. Even highly unlikely events are logically possible. If this possibility is realized, then the account would not count the loiterer as treating the passerby merely as a means. For example, the lender might believe that the borrower will pay him back, but share her end of her getting money from him without repaying it because he believes that if she does, she will bring about something he covets, namely, the demise of her reputation.
Some philosophers insist, however, that this sort of scenario is not logically possible; for in order to be making a loan to another, a person must not only believe that his money will be repaid, but want and hope that it will be Papadaki 78 , they say. This reading of possible end sharing might have implausible implications when incorporated into a principle according to which a person who uses another treats the other merely as a means if the other cannot share the end she is pursuing in using him Kerstein Consider young men hiking in the Rocky Mountains for the first time who find themselves on a mountain in late afternoon without water and unsure of the way down.
To their relief, they spot another hiker, someone whom they saw park his car in the same area below. They follow him, using his knowledge of the terrain to get down the mountain safely. The young men realize that they could, but choose not to, tell the hiker that they are following him.
Out of embarrassment for their dependence on him, they ensure that they remain undetected. The way they act prevents the man from choosing whether to contribute to the realization of their end. If the hiker fails to have a right not to be prevented from choosing whether to contribute to the young men getting safely down the mountain, then they do not treat him merely as a means according to the amended account.
Of course, this amendment invites questions as to when a person has such a right, as well as making the account of treating others merely as means depend on an account of moral rights in a way that Korsgaard or Kant might not have intended.
In typical cases, it would be irrational for the promisee to try to realize the end of making a loan that is never to be repaid. The notion of practical irrationality at work here seems implicit in the Groundwork.
Kant there — introduces a principle that Thomas Hill, Jr. Willing an end presumably involves setting it and attempting to realize it. According to Kant, the hypothetical imperative is a principle of reason: all of us are rationally compelled to conform to this principle.
An agent would be violating the hypothetical imperative and thus acting irrationally by willing an end yet, at the same time, willing another end, the attainment of which would, he is aware, make it impossible for him to take the otherwise available and necessary means to his original end.
An agent would violate the hypothetical imperative, for example, by willing now to buy a house and yet, at the same time, willing to use the money he knows he needs for the down payment to make a gift to his niece.
If he willed to make the gift, he would be failing to will the necessary means in his power to buy the house. The Kantian hypothetical imperative implies that it is irrational to will to be thwarted in attaining ends that one is pursuing.
In typical cases, if a promisee willed the end of a false promisor, she would be doing just that. There are two things that an agent who has willed something can do which would bring his action into compliance with the hypothetical imperative.
He can either will the means that are necessary and in his power to the end which, of course, would rule out his willing to be thwarted in attaining the end or he can give up willing the end. For example, the hypothetical imperative would not imply that it was irrational for the person described above to cease willing now to buy a house and instead use the money that he knows would be required as a down payment on it to make a gift to his niece.
By way of illustration, suppose that a doctor plans to use a healthy patient to obtain a heart and lungs for transplant, that is, to extract them from him in an operation that would kill him.
Her proximate end might also be her ultimate end, say, if she uses another to avoid pain. But her proximate end might be far removed from her ultimate end.
Someone might, for example, use another to develop her skill as a violinist to earn a good living in an orchestra so she can put her little sisters through college, and so forth.
The account invokes proximate ends because they are far more intimately connected to the use that brings them about than ultimate ends need be. Yet, like the other accounts we have considered, this account is subject to criticism.
One possible shortcoming stems from cases of competition Kerstein — Sometimes people have the end of being the sole winner in a competition. To begin, competitors sometimes count as treating one another as means. In willing that A be top player of the year, B would, in effect, be willing to be thwarted in his attempt to win top player for the year, assuming that there can be no tie for top player.
Some might find this implication implausible. Sometimes becoming the best in some endeavor involves defeating and using competitors to do so. But defeating and using competitors to be the best, especially when they have freely entered a competition, need not amount to acting wrongly, some might insist. In the passage on false promising, Kant references possible consent. He suggests that the victim of the false promise cannot agree to the use the false promisor is making of him.
Suppose, for example, that an appliance serviceperson tricks a customer into authorizing an expensive repair. For he does not know what her action is, namely one of lying to him about what is wrong with his refrigerator. If he did know what her action was, then he would not be deceived. Or suppose that a mugger approaches you on a dark street, points a gun at you, and tells you that unless you give him all of your money, he will hurt you.
He leaves you no opportunity to avert his use of you by withholding your consent. Regardless of what you say, he is presumably going to use you, whether it is through your handing over your wallet or his violently taking it from you.
0コメント